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I. INTRODUCTION

After graduating from business school a very ambitious graduate decides to
start her own insurance company. However, the graduate is unable to attract
clients to her new company. After much debate, the graduate decides she needs
to engage in intensive advertising for her new company. Therefore, she pays for
television commercials, billboard displays, and newspaper advertisements.
However, the insurance company continues to struggle with attracting new clients.
Eventually the graduate realizes that her best chance of reaching the greatest
number of people with her advertisements is to advertise on the Internet. She
contacts a popular search engine that allows her to pick "keywords" that will
prompt her advertisements to display on search result pages. Because of her
limited budget, she decides to pick only one keyword. She picks the term
"GEICO" as her keyword. Therefore, when search engine users type in the term
GEICO, the graduate's insurance company will appear as an advertisement on the
search results page.
The above example poses many questions: Has the graduate engaged in
trademark infringement by using the term GEICO as a keyword? Where will the
graduate's advertisement appear in relation to the search results for the term
GEICO? Will the graduate's advertisement mislead consumers into believing the
graduate's insurance company is somehow connected to the GEICO insurance
company? The confusion caused by the above scenario and countless other
similar situations is at the heart of the debate between trademark owners and
search engines regarding advertising on the Internet, specifically advertising
known as "keyword advertising."
The legality of keyword advertising under the Lanham Act has been heavily
debated for the past few years with no clear answer emerging.' However, while
the legal issues are being resolved, trademark owners are left empty-handed, and
search engines continue to make millions with the keyword advertising model.2
Trademark owners' cries for help finally resonated enough in Utah to prompt
legislation concerning the practice. In 2007, the Utah legislature passed a statute
known as the Trademark Protection Act (Utah Act), which restricted the use and

1 Compare Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007
WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (holding that the sale of trademarked terms in Google's
keyword advertising program constituted a use in commerce under the Lanham Act), with Merck &
Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that
merely purchasing another's mark as a search engine keyword does not constitute use of that mark
under the Lanham Act).
2 See Lauren Troxclair, Note, Search Engines and InternetAdvertisers: Just One Chck Away From
Trademark Infingement?, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1365, 1374 (2005) (noting that advertising sales
made up 99% of Google's 2004 total revenue).
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purchase of trademarks as keywords.3 While the case law on the topic of keyword
advertising and whether the use of trademarked terms as keywords constitutes
trademark infringement is unclear and many questions are left unanswered, it
appears that the Utah Act was not an appropriate fix to a complex problem
because the law remained in a state of flux during its brief enactment. The Utah
Act was signed into law, but its implementation was dependent on the completion
of a registry, which the legislature put on hold after protests by search engines and
others.4 A year later, the law was amended by S.B. 151, which deleted the
substantive provisions under the original Utah Act that would have regulated
keyword advertising.'
This Note argues that the Utah Legislature was correct to repeal the Utah Act
because it was unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Part II
provides background information on keyword advertising, discusses the
arguments rendered by both sides on the legality of selling trademarks for
keyword advertising, examines provisions of the Utah law, addresses the current
state of the case law on the topic, and summarizes for comparison purposes other
Internet-related statutes passed by various states. Part III analyzes the
constitutionality of the Utah law by examining whether the law violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause. This part compares and contrasts the Utah Act with
other Internet-related state statutes that are discussed in Part II. This part argues
that the Utah Act was unconstitutional because, although it was not facially
discriminatory, it favored local economic interests to the detriment of out-of-state
competitors and placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will begin by providing a brief introduction to keyword advertising,
discussing the arguments put forth by both sides of the debate and reviewing the
current state of the law. Next, a summary of the Utah Act will be presented.
Finally, this part will conclude with a short overview of the Dormant Commerce
Clause and a discussion of several cases involving conflicts between state-enacted
Internet regulations and the Dormant Commerce Clause.

3 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS,
AND MONOPOLIES § 22.25 (4th ed. 2007).
4 Alan Cohen, The Searchfor an Answer, IP L. & Bus., Aug. 2007, at 12.
5 S.B. 151, 2008 Gen. Sess., 2008 Utah Laws 258.
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A. WHAT IS KEYWORD ADVERTISING?

Keyword advertising is a recent form of online advertising that has proven to
be extremely lucrative for search engine companies.' In the Internet's early days,
advertising was largely considered a hit or miss proposition because the
advertisers could not have their advertisements connected to specific search
terms.7 As a result, the advertisements were randomly displayed in hopes that the
advertisement displayed on the search results page would occasionally relate to the
terms that were being searched by the search engine user.8
Eventually keyword technology was invented, which allowed advertisements
to be directly tied to specific terms. 9 This type of advertising is called keyword
advertising and allows advertisers to choose "keywords" that, when entered into
a search engine, will trigger the advertisers' ads and then display them on the
search results page.' Keywords are merely terms or phrases that are entered into
a search engine by a person wanting to find an Internet website pertaining to the
particular words entered.1 After the keywords have been entered into the search
engine, the results page appears and contains the advertisements for those
advertisers who have purchased the keywords.12 The advertisements are set apart
from the search results and labeled titles such as "sponsored links" (Google) or
"sponsored sites" (MSN).' 3
This form of advertising, used by search engine companies such as Yahoo! and
Google, is a fairly simple method. 4 The search engine companies use an auction
process in which the highest bidders are awarded the opportunity to buy specific
search terms.' The majority of keyword advertising services allow multiple
advertisers to bid on a specific keyword.' 6 An advertiser's bid consists of the

6 See Christopher Kelly, KeYwordAds: Effective Marketing orTrademark Infringement?,TRADEMARK

ALERT (Wiley Rein & Fielding Trademark Practice Group, Washington, D.C.), July 2004, at 1,
http://www.wileyrein.com/docs/Newsletterissues/44.pdf
(citing estimates that keyword
advertising has become the main source of Internet advertising revenue).
7 Id.
8 Id

9 Id.
10 Gregory Shea, Note, Trademarks and Keyword BannerAdverisin& 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 529, 532

(2002).
" Paul W. Garrity, Search Engine Advertising 101, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2007,
at 18, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/March/18.pdf.
12 Id
13 Id.
4 Gianni P. Servodidio, KywordAdvertiing, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 16, 2006, at S6.

15 Id.
16 Sheldon Klein et al., Use of Trademarks in Kyword-Tnggered Search EngineAdvertising a Hot Topic

in IntemetLaw,ARENT FoxPUBLICATIONS, Apr. 22,2004, http://www.arentfox.com/publications/
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maximum price the advertiser will pay for each instance a search engine user clicks
on the advertisement, since generally the advertiser only pays each time the
advertisement is clicked on.'" The process has resulted in huge profits for the
search engine companies and has become a multibillion dollar industry.'" For
example, Google earns over 90% of its total revenue from its keyword advertising
program, which includes hundreds of thousands of participants. 9
B. THE PROBLEM WITH KEYWORD ADVERTISING

At first glance, keyword advertising appears to be a legitimate advertising
program that provides more benefits for consumers because they are given
choices when viewing products and services on the Internet. 2° However, the
problem with keyword advertising lies in the manner in which the keyword
advertising programs have shifted away from the use of merely generic terms as
keywords and towards a program in which generic and trademarked terms are
used as keywords. Search engine companies have allowed advertisers to buy
third-party trademarks as keywords.2' For example, Dell could purchase the
keyword "Toshiba" so that when a person searches the terms "Toshiba
computer," a Dell computer advertisement would appear on the search results
page. The Dell computer advertisement could potentially attract the person away
from the Toshiba computer results and toward the Dell computer website. 2
As a result of this possibility, trademark owners have voiced their concerns
and raised objections to the selling of trademarks by search engines as keywords.'
However, because of the large revenues that keyword advertising generates, search
engine companies have held strong to their stance that keyword advertising does
not infringe trademark owners' rights.24

index.cfm?fa=legalUpdateDisp&contentjid=836.
'7 Aaron D. Hendelman, KeywordAdvertisng: A Snapshot, 6 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 14 (2004).
1s Shea, supra note 10, at 532.
9 Klein, supra note 16.
20 See Servodidio, supra note 14 (noting that keyword searches connect consumers and
advertisers in a way that "enhances the functionality of the Internet as a resource locator".
21 Hendelman, supra note 17.
2 See id. (using an example involving a Ford truck dealer purchasing the term "Chevy trucks"
as a keyword to result in advertisements on the "Chevy truck" results page).
23 See Garrity,supra note 11 (discussing litigation brought by trademark owners in response to
keyword advertising).
24 Klein, supra note 16.
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C. TRADEMARK OWNERS' ARGUMENTS

Trademark owners advance several arguments against the legality of search
engine companies allowing third-party trademarks to be bought for keyword
advertising. The basic claim trademark owners make is that search engines are
being unjustly enriched by exploiting trademarks without permission in order to
earn substantial profits.2" The specific claims include trademark infringement,
unfair competition, and dilution under the Lanham Act and state law.26 The
trademark owners argue that because the search engines are using the marks in
commerce inconnection with the selling or advertising of goods and services in
such a way that is likely to cause confusion, all elements needed to constitute
trademark infringement and unfair competition are met.27 The owners argue that
keyword advertising can result in confusion for the consumers because most of
the advertisements are placed on the search results page as "sponsored links," and
it is not clear who sponsors the advertisement.2'
D. SEARCH ENGINES' ARGUMENTS

The search engines' basic argument in support of their position is that their
keyword advertising is not any different from other forms of non-online
advertising in which consumers are presented with a choice of products from
various competitors. 29 The search engines argue that "deliberately targeting an ad
to customers who are buying, considering buying, or seeking information about
a competitor's product or service does not constitute a trademark violation.""
In response to the trademark infringement claim, the search engines argue that
their service does not qualify as a "use" of the trademark.3 Additionally, the
search engines argue that, because advertisers use their own names in the
advertisements when referring to the identity of the source of their goods or
services, the likelihood of confusion argument fails.32

25 id.

2 Sheldon H. Klein & Henry Huffnagle, IV, Spkt Decisions: The Issue of "Use" in the Context of
Search Engine Kqword-TggeredAdvertisng, 19 No. 12 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2007).
SKlein, supra note 16.
28Id
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.

32Id.
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E. THE LANHAM ACT AND CURRENT CASE LAW CONCERNING KEYWORD
ADVERTISING

1. Lanham Act. Trademark disputes are governed by the federal statute
known as the Lanham Act13 and state trademark law.34 Originally, trademark law
in the United States was derived from common law and state statues.35 In the late
nineteenth century, in the "now-famous Trade-Mark Cases," the Court stated that
Congress's power to enact federal trademark legislation is not derived from the
Patent and Copyright Clause but instead must be derived from the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. 36 Because the Court declared that Congress must
derive its trademark legislating power from the Commerce Clause, the Lanham
Act only applies where there is a "use in commerce."37 When enacting the
Lanham Act, Congress intended to utilize the fullest extent of its power available
under the Commerce Clause; therefore, the Act is interpreted broadly.38
When trademark law was first established, the purpose of trademarks was to
serve as "identifier[s] of the particular source of particular goods." 39 Therefore
the central purpose of trademark law since its inception has been to prevent
confusion.' This central purpose is embodied by the Lanham Act, which was
enacted to prohibit trademark uses in commerce that were "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."41 Another main purpose of
trademark law is to protect the owner's investment in the mark and the associated
goodwill of a mark that has been developed by the mark's holder.42
The Lanham Act defines a trademark to include "any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof used by a person . . . to identify and

33 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
3 Jamie K Neal, Note, FederalTrademark Law Protection: Rebutting theMyth That a TrademarkMust
Stem From a Pre-ExistingState Common-Law Rzght, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597-98 (2000).
3' Andrew T. Spence, Note, When a Landmark Cannot Serve as a Trademark: Trademark Protection
forBuildingDesignsin Light of Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Productions, 2
WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 517, 519 (2000).
6 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS,
AND MONOPOLIES § 26.1 (4th ed. 2007).
3' Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Lanham Act Trademark Infringement Actions in Internet and
Website Context, 197 A.L.R. FED. 17, 31 (2004).
38 Id
39 Paul L. Bonewitz, Note, Byond Confusion: Reexamining Trademark Law's Goals in the World
of Online Advering, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 899, 899 (2007) (quoting Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306
F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002)).
40Id.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
42Buckman, supra note 37, at 31.
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distinguish his or her goods."43 The Lanham Act defines the term "use in
commerce" as "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade."'
After a mark is registered, the trademark owner can prevent appropriation of the
mark if one important qualification is met: the owner "must have used or intend
to use the mark in interstate commerce., 4 As discussed above, because
trademark law evolved from common law, adoption of a mark is not enough to
qualify for rights under
the Lanham Act. The right of a mark is derived from its
"use in commerce." 46
The Lanham Act provides two main forms of protection for trademark
owners from subsequent users who attempt to infringe on the trademark by
confusing the public as to the source of the goods or services. 47 First, a person
becomes liable for trademark infringement if he "uses a similar mark in commerce
that is likely to cause confusion among consumers without the consent of the
registrant."4 Second, a civil cause of action is available under the federal unfair
competition statute "against anyone who perpetuates a false designation of the
origin of a product or any false or misleading descriptions likely to cause
'4 9
confusion in the marketplace."
2. CurrentCaseLaw. Several cases have been recently decided that explore the
effect of the Lanham Act on the issue of keyword advertising. For example,
P/qyboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Netscape CommunicationsCorp. ° involved a suit by Playboy
against the search engines Netscape and Excite for including the keywords
"playboy"'" and "playmate" 2 in the list of keywords these search engines used for
adult entertainment advertisers to trigger their advertisements. 3 The defendants
maintained a list of over 400 terms that triggered adult entertainment
advertisements. 4 Playboy argued that the advertisements were likely to be
confusing to consumers because the advertisements were not clearly labeled as to
the sponsor, and therefore the ads resulted in "initial interest confusion" that took
advantage of the goodwill associated with the trademark. 5' The lower court

4115 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
Id.See the statute for the full definition of the term "use in commerce."
4 Spence, supra note 35, at 524.
46 Id.
41 Id at 525.

4 id.
49 Id.

s Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
s Id.at 1023 (stating the term "playboy" is trademarked by Playboy Enterprises).
52 Id.(stating the term "playmate" is trademarked by Playboy Enterprises).

53Id.
4 id.
at 1024-25.
11 Id.
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granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 56 but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact at to Playboy's
trademark infringement and dilution claims.5 7 However, the Ninth Circuit did
note that if the source of the advertisements was clearly ascertainable, this "might
eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in [the] case.""
59
After the Ninth Circuit's decision, the parties settled on undisclosed terms.
Another case involving the issue of keyword advertising is GovernmentEmployees
Insurance Co. v. Googk, Inc.60 This case is an important decision in the keyword
advertising debate because it was the first to state explicitly that the process of
keyword advertising constitutes "use" of the mark as required under the Lanham
Act. 6' The case involved a suit in which the plaintiff GEICO asserted a claim
against Google alleging that the use of the terms "GEICO '62 and "GEICO
DIRECT ' 63 as keywords constituted trademark infringement, unfair competition,
and dilution. 64 The district court denied in part Google's motion to dismiss,
stating that Google did use plaintiff s trademark for purposes of the Lanham Act,
although not necessarily improperly.65 The court stated that "[t]he complaint
clearly allege[d] that defendants use plaintiff s trademarks to sell advertising, and
then link that advertising to results of searches., 66 The court felt the defendants'
process of selling the plaintiff's trademarks for purposes of linking advertisements
was a use in commerce that could imply the defendants had received permission
from the trademark owners to run these ads.67 In a later opinion concerning the
likelihood of confusion claim, the court found that the plaintiff failed to show
that Google's use of GEICO's trademark as a keyword created a sufficient
68
likelihood of confusion to violate the Lanham Act.

's Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 2000 WL 1308815 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(ordering summary judgment on Netscape's motion against Playboy's complaint).
51 Playboy EnterprisesInc., 354 F.3d at 1034.
s' Id at 1030 n.43.
59 Klein, supra note 16.
' 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004).
61See Klein & Huffnagle, supra note 26, at 1 (discussing keyword-triggered search engine

advertising).
62 Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702 n.2 (stating that plaintiff received federal
trademark registration for the term "GEICO").
63See id (stating that plaintiff received federal trademark registration for the term "GEICO
DIRECT").
Id at 701.
65 Id. at 704. The court did grant Google's motion to dismiss the state law counts of tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage and statutory civil business conspiracy. Id
at 705-06.
66 Id at 703-04.
67Id at 704.
Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at 7, 77
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A third important case involving keyword advertising is Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc.69 This case represents the united stance that the Second Circuit district
courts are taking in the keyword advertising debate regarding "use in
commerce." 7
In Rescuecom, the plaintiff, a computer services franchising
company, sued Google for allowing competitors to bid on Rescuecom's
trademark as a keyword and recommending the plaintiffs trademark as a potential
keyword to make the competitors' advertising more successful.7" The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of New York granted Google's motion
to dismiss all counts of the complaint filed by Rescuecom.72 The court held that
the alleged sale of Rescuecom's mark to the plaintiff's competitors through
Google's keyword advertising program was not actionable because it did not
qualify under the the Lanham Act as a "use" of the trademark. 73 The court found
that the use requirement was not met because "there [was] no allegation that
defendant places plaintiffs trademark on any goods, containers,
displays, or
74
advertisements, or that its internal use is visible to the public.
F.

UTAH ACT

In response to the above cases and the abundance of other ongoing,
conflicting case law on the topic of keyword advertising, Utah decided to pass its
own law dealing with the topic of keyword advertising. v On March 19,2007, the
Utah legislature passed a law, known as the Trademark Protection Act, which
restricted the use and purchase of trademarks as keywords.7 6 Utah was the first
77
state to pass such legislation.
The Utah Act created a new kind of intellectual property right known as the
"electronic registration mark. 7' The Utah Act applied to any term that was used
inconnection with a business and included existing trademarks and service marks,
regardless of whether or not they are registered with the federal government or

U.S.P.Q.2d 1841 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
69 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
70 Klein & Huffnagle, supra note 26, at 4-5.
71 Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
72 Id. at 404.
71 Id. at 403.
74 Id.

" Trademark Protection Act, S.B. 236, 2007 Gen. Sess., 2007 Utah Laws 365 (codified in
scattered sections of Tide 70, ch. 3a).
76 Jeffrey Becker & Leanne Stendell, Utah Law First to Place Reshctnions on Kgyword Advertising,
Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.haynesboone.com/knowledge/knowledge-detail.asp?groupid=40&page
=pubs&pubid= 1930.
77 id.
78 UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-103(1)(e) (Supp. 2007).
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with any state.79 Any of these types of terms could be registered as electronic
registration marks, provided the terms were used in connection with goods,
services, or advertising in the state of Utah. °
By paying an annual fee,8 1 a company or a person could register both new
words, terms, or names, as well as existing trademarks." After a trademark owner
registered its trademark as an electronic registration mark, search engines were
prohibited from selling the mark to advertisers to generate search results that
would trigger advertising that was either: (1) "of the same class" or (2) "likely to
cause confusion between the business, goods, or service of the registrant of the
electronic registration mark and the business, goods, or service advertised." 3 The
law required the registrations to be updated annually.'
The law was only applicable to situations when the Internet user viewing the
ad, the advertiser, or the advertisement provider was located in Utah." The
holder of the electronic registration mark could bring claims against both the
search engine and the advertiser if there was an improper use of the mark. 6 The
remedies available for a violation of the Utah Act included injunctive relief and
damages.8 7
G. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

As discussed above, Utah attempted to fix the keyword advertising trademark
infringement problem by passing its own act restricting keyword advertising. In
order to analyze the constitutionality of the Utah Act under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, it is important to understand the framework of Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.
There is no explicit language in the Constitution outlining the Dormant
Commerce Clause (DCC). 8 The idea of the Dormant Commerce Clause has
been created by courts based on "the negative implications of the grant of power
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce."8 9 Congress's power to regulate

7 Id § 70-3a-103(1)(e)-(O.
so Id. § 70-3a-103(2)(a)-(b).
81 Id. § 70-3a-203(1).
82 D. Craig Parry, The Utah Trademark ProtectionAct, 25 ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET
LITIG. REP. 10 (2007).
83 See § 70-3a-402(l)(c)(i)-(i).
84 Id. § 70-3a-305(6)(a)-(b).
ss Id. § 70-3a-402(3)(a)-(b).
86 Id

Id. § 70-3a-404; see also Parry,supranote 82 (noting that damages might include all profits made
from the illegal advertising or the lost profits of the mark's registrant).
8 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (16th ed. 2007).
87

89 Id.
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interstate commerce is found in Article I of the Constitution, which states "[t]he
Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States ... "90 From this affirmative grant of power to
Congress, the Court "has read judicially enforceable limits on state legislation
when Congress has not acted." 9' To support the notion of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Court has looked to history and the structure of the
federal government." Based on the notion of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
the Court has decided that some forms of protectionist state legislation are
invalid. 93 As a result of the Dormant Commerce Clause, states "generally may not
interfere with interstate commerce by discriminating against it, the persons
engaged therein, or the citizens of, or property originating in, another state. 94
During the nineteenth century, the Court focused on several different
categorical distinctions in order to decide when a state had overreached its power
and violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 9 However, today those distinctions
are no longer used by the Court in its Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 96
Today, the Court has three modern categories of Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. 97 The first category consists of state laws that facially discriminate
against out-of-state commerce.9" If a state law is facially discriminatory, then the
Court has generally subjected the law to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity, and
will virtually always be struck down."9 9 The best example of a state law that
facially discriminates against out-of-state commerce is a law that "overtly blocks
the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders. ''" °° Because of the Court's

90 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3.
91 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note

88, at 175.

92 Id.
93 Id

.

9 15 C.J.S. Commerre § 51 (2002).
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (establishing in dicta the distinctions
between state police powers, which allowed the state to enact legislation regarding inspection laws,
quarantine laws, and health laws, and Congress's commerce power, which allowed Congress to enact
legislation regulating interstate commerce); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851) (developing the distinction between subjects that are "of such a nature" that they require a
national rule, which would result in a "single uniform rule," and subjects that are of a local concern
and require only a local rule, which would allow local necessities that greatly vary from state to state
to be addressed); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (creating the distinction between the
burdens on interstate commerce that were merely indirect and the burdens on interstate commerce
that had a direct impact).
96 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 88, at 183.
97 Id.
9' Id.
at 183-84.
99 Id.at 184.
" Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (describing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275
(1875), where the Court invalidated a Missouri license requirement because it was facially
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essentially blanket ban on laws that facially discriminate against interstate
commerce, it is rare that states attempt to pass such legislation.''
The second category of modem Dormant Commerce Clause analysis involves
state laws that are facially neutral but, when applied, act to directly regulate or
discriminate against interstate commerce, or favor local economic interests to the
detriment of out-of-state competitors." 2 The court has also found this category
of laws to be per se invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 1°3 The Court
has labeled the state laws that directly regulate interstate commerce as
"extraterritoriality" laws," while laws that favor local interests to the detriment
of out-of-state interests are labeled as "protectionist" laws. 5 However, because
the discrimination is not explicitly stated, the discriminatory purpose is often hard
to detect based merely on the text and history of the statute.1 0 6 For these reasons,
the Court has looked beyond the text and history of the statute and attempted to
detect discriminatory protectionist
and extraterritoriality laws by evaluating the
0 7
effects of the state rule.
The third category of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis involves state laws
that are facially neutral but have a disproportionate adverse effect on interstate
commerce based on the court's application of a balancing approach. 8 The
balancing approach that is used in this category was developed in the case Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc."° The balancing test was quoted in the case as:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. [If] a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be

discriminatory against out-of-state commerce).
10 SuLLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 88, at 206.
102Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).

103See id. (stating that these types of laws are generally struck down without further inquiry).
'o4 See id at 581 (discussing that the Court had previously examined a New York statute that had
"extraterritorial effects").
100SULULVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 88, at 206.
106 Id.

"07Id. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (holding a state
law invalid that prohibited closed containers of apples to bear a "grade other than the applicable U.S.
grade or standard" when shipped into the state because the law had "the practical effect of not only
burdening interstate sales of [ ] apples, but also discriminating against [the other states]").
0 SULLVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 88, at 184.
'09 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating an Arizona statute that required
all cantaloupes grown in Arizona to advertise the state of origin on the cantaloupes' packages).
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tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
0
impact on interstate activities."
Generally when applying the balancing test, the Court has been deferential to state
legislatures that pass regulations having an effect on public health and safety."'
However, as the Court noted in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Coqp.,
"[r]egulations designed for [such a] salutary purpose nevertheless may further the
purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be
invalid under the Commerce Clause.""' 2
The court has developed several exceptions to the Dormant Commerce
Clause." 3 One of these exceptions involves quarantine laws." 4 Although a
quarantine law may be facially discriminatory against outsiders, the Court has
upheld such laws because they provide special health-protective measures." 5 The
Court has also carved out an exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause when
the state is acting not as a "regulator" but as a "market participant.""' 6 When the
state is in the role of market participant, the state may discriminate in favor of its
residents." 7 In Hughes v. AlexandriaScrap, one of the first cases to discuss the idea
of the market participant exception, the court stated that "[n]othing in the
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others.""' 8

110 Id at 142 (citation omitted).
" See SuLLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 88, at 219 (citing cases in which Court deferred to
state's interest in safety of transportation).
112 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981).
113 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 88, at 191.
114 Id Quarantine laws are special laws aimed at preventing the transportation ofnoxious articles,

such as diseased livestock, because the movement of such articles poses risks of "contagion and
other evils." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978).
11 See Phiade"bia,437 U.S. at 628 (stating that "it is true that certain quarantine laws have not
been considered forbidden protectionist measures, even though they were directed against out-ofstate commerce').
116 15 C.J.S. Commerce § 51 (2002).
For example, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the Court found no
Dormant Commerce Clause violation in a South Dakota policy of selling cement from a state-owned
plant solely to South Dakota residents. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). The policy facially discriminated against
out-of-state residents; however, since South Dakota was participating in the market as a
manufacturer, not as a regulator, the Court recognized the state's ability to freely choose the parties
with whom it would deal. Id. at 440.
117See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 438-39 ("[Wlhen acting as proprietors, States should similarly shave
existing freedoms from ... the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause.").
11' Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
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H. INTERNET-ISSUE-RELATED CASES INVOLVING DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
ANALYSIS

Because no other state has attempted to pass a similar trademark protection
act and the Utah Act was never officially implemented and therefore never
challenged in court, it is necessary to look at other analogous cases involving state
statutes that attempted to regulate the Internet. The first set of cases discusses
state statutes that attempted to regulate Internet communications involving
sexually explicit materials with minors. The next set of cases involves state
statutes that sought to regulate Internet-related "spain." The final group of cases
discusses state statutes enacted for the purpose of regulating business-related
Internet communications.19
1. Statutes Regulating Internet-based Communication of Sexualy EplictMaterials to
Minors. The court in American LibrariesAss'n v. Patak' 20 held that a New York
penal law was unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because it
unduly burdened interstate commerce.12 1 The law made it a crime to use
electronic mail to send sexually explicit materials to minors."2 Nothing in the
statute stated that the restricted communication must occur entirely within the
state of New York.'23
After an in-depth discussion of the borderless nature of the Internet, 124 the
court concluded that the statute reached conduct that occurred beyond the state
line of New York; therefore the law needed to be analyzed under traditional

19

See generaly Amy Keane, Annotation, Va'dity of State Statutes and Administrative Regulations

RegulatingInternet Communications Under Commerce Clause and FirstAmendmentof FederalConstitution, 98
A.L.R.5TH 167 (2002) (validity of state statutes regulating Internet communications under
Commerce Clause).
120 Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The plaintiffs, all of whom
used the Intemet inside and outside the state of New York for a broad range of communication
purposes, were a group that consisted of libraries, book and magazine publishers, electronic and
print booksellers, software sellers, Internet service providers, artists, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and others that banded together to protect the right of freedom of speech. Id at 161-62.
121 Id. at 167.
122 See id. at 163 (stating that the statute prohibited the use of a computer for communication

with a minor that depicted "actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse,
and which [was] harmful to minors" and applied to "any computer communication system allowing
the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one
computer to another").
123 See id at 169-70 (stating that the actual text of the Act did not limit the criminal
communication to that occurring solely within the state of New York and that the legislative history
of the Act clearly showed that the legislators understood and intended for the Act to extend to
communication between residents of New York and persons located outside the state).
124 See id.
at 170 (describing the Internet as being "wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions').
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Dormant Commerce Clause principles. 2 ' The court initially examined the New
York law under the second category of the Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis12 6-- 1aws that directly discriminate against out-of-state commerce.1 27 The
court stated that due to the unique nature of the Internet, it was impossible to
limit the effect of the New York law to those Internet communications taking
place solely within the state of New York.22 The court found that New York had
"deliberately imposed its legislation on the Internet and, by doing so, projected
its law into other states whose citizens use the Net. 1 29 Consequently, the court
found the New York law to be a per se violation of the Dormant Commerce
30
Clause.'
The court extended its analysis by also examining the New York law under the
Pike balancing test.13 1 With respect to the Pike balancing test, the court weighed
the local benefits of the statute against the effects on interstate commerce.'32 The
court felt the state interest in protecting children from pornography was a
"quintessentially legitimate state objective.' ' 3 3 However, when the court looked
to the local benefits to be gained from the New York law, the court found the
benefits not overwhelming. 3 The court reasoned that the law would not apply
to communications that originated outside the United States, and thus children
could still potentially be exposed to pornography. 3 ' Also weighing against the
local benefits of the statute was the fact that New York already had in place
several other statutes that were designed to protect children from obscenity and
child pornography.'36 Therefore, the court concluded that the only local benefits
to be gained from the statute were limited to those few rare cases that did not
qualify under any of the other relevant statutes. 3 7 The court further found that
New York would have practical problems prosecuting parties
from out of state
38
that had violated the law because of jurisdictional issues.'

12 Id. at 173.
126 Id at 169.
127 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
128

Am. LibraiesAss'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177.

129

id
Id.
Id.
id
Id.

130
131
132
133

134
135

Id. at 178.
See id (staring that almost half of Internet communications stem from locations outside the

United States).
136 See id. at 179 (stating that "the State is able to protect children through vigorous enforcement
of the existing laws criminalizing obscenity and child pornography").
Id.
138 Id. at 178.
137
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While finding the local benefits of the New York statute to be small, the court
found the burdens on interstate commerce to be clearly excessive. 139 The court
felt the New York law would have a "chilling effect" because Internet users were
likely to reduce their activities greatly in order to avoid engaging in actions
prohibited under the law."4 Also, the court argued that this effect would greatly
exceed the actual number of cases that were prosecuted under the New York
law. 4' The court also discussed how the law was likely to have a broad reach and
could possibly even prohibit the artwork that museums or academic institutions
post on the Internet because such images could be found harmful to minors.'4 2
The court argued that an impossible choice ensued when Internet users wanting
to communicate images that could possibly fall within the confines of the Act had
to either self-censor or face the potential of prosecution, thus an unjust restriction
on interstate commerce was created.' 43 Therefore, the court found that the New
York law placed an excessive burden on interstate commerce which was not
justifiable because of the limited local benefits that would result from it.'" The
court's opinion noted that it felt that national, uniform regulation, as opposed to
state-by-state regulation, was needed to govern the Internet. 4 '
In American Booksellers Foundationv. Dean,46 the court found a per se violation
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.'47 The Vermont statute at issue in the case
prohibited Internet communications with minors that involved distribution of
sexually explicit materials that were deemed harmful to minors.' The challengers
of the statute were out-of-state operators of Internet websites that provided
sexual health advice.'" The court found that the practical effect of the statute was
that it projected Vermont law into other states, thus directly regulating commerce

'39 Id
140 Id
141

at 179.

Id.

142 See id at 180 (discussing that many famous nude artworks by Botticelli, Manet, Matisse, and

Cezanne can'be found on the Internet).
143

Id.

144

Id at 181.
See id. (stating that "inconsistent regulatory schemes could paralyze the development of the

145

Internet altogether").
" Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003).
147 Id.
148 Id at 99.

149

See id at 98-99. One plaintiff, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business was

in Connecticut, provided a website that consisted of sexually-related information. Id The second
plaintiff was a local Vermont chapter of the ACLU, and although the local chapter's website did not
contain sex-related materials, the national organization's website did include such topics as birth
control, safe sex, and sex education. Id at 99.
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within those states."' Therefore, the statute was a per se violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause because, although the statute on its face did not
apply to Internet website operators located outside the state ofVermont that were
disseminating information via the Internet, the statute's effect was to directly
regulate commerce within other states.'
In contrast to the above cases, the court in People v. Hsu5 2 held a California
penal law involving the Internet to be constitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 3 The statute provided that any person who knowingly
distributed "harmful matter"'" through the Internet to a minor with the purpose
of "appealing" to and "seducing" the minor would be criminally liable. ' Like the
court in American Libraries Ass'n, this court applied the Pike balancing test in
analyzing whether the statute was constitutional."' However, this court's analysis
under the Pike test reached a different result from that in American LibrariesAss'n.
The California court found that the local state interest in protecting minors from
any incidental effect the statute might have on interstate
harm outweighed
7
5

commerce.1

The defendant in Hsu relied heavily on the arguments from American Libraries
Ass'n;5 8 however, the California court rejected the argument that the enforcement
of the statute would cause inconsistent regulations on Internet users.'59 Instead
the court found that the knowledge and intent elements of the statute narrowly

150 See id at 103 (stating that when a person in Connecticut posts materials on the Internet
intending for the materials to be seen by other people in Connecticut, the person must also consider

that someone from Vermont could view the material, thus meaning that persons located outside of
Vermont must comply with the statute or face potential prosecution by Vermont).
151Id. at 104.
152People v. Hsu, 82 Cal. App. 4th 976 (1st Dist. 2000). This case was the result of an

undercover operation that involved the arrest of a California man who sent sexually suggestive
photos to a California boy he knew to be fourteen years old, offered to participate in sexual acts with
the boy, and encouraged the boy to come to his house. Id at 981.
153

Id. at 985.

154

See id.
at 982 (defining harmful matter as matter that "appeals to the prurient interest" and

"depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct" and "lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors").
155 Id.
156

Id at 983.

See id at 984. The court stated that it is a compelling state interest to protect minors from
harm in general, so it is an especially compelling interest to protect them from being seduced to
engage in sexual activities. Id However, the court found it nearly impossible to imagine "any
legitimate commerce that would be burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual
material to known minors in order to seduce them." Id
15' See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
159 Hsu, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 984-85.
157
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restricted the scope of the statute's effect on Internet communications. 6 ° Thus
the court concluded that the limiting language of the statute prevented Internet
users from being subjected to inconsistent
regulations and therefore the statute
16 1
did not burden interstate commerce.
The challengers of the statute further argued that it regulated conduct that
occurred outside the state of California, thus qualifying as a per se violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 62 However, the court also rejected this argument. 63
The court examined the entire California penal scheme and found that only
criminal acts that occur wholly or partially within the state of California can be
prosecuted under the statute.16 1 The court reasoned that because the statute did
not refer to any specific place of performance, the legislature did not intend for
the law to regulate activity occurring outside the state. 16 Because the statute did
66
not regulate conduct outside the state, it did not burden interstate commerce.1
2. Statutes Regulating Spam. Spam is "unsolicited commercial bulk electronic
mail.' 167 Spain is considered a nuisance by many users of the Internet who have
electronic mail service. 68 As a result of spare, many Internet users find their
inboxes overcrowded with emails regarding "pornography, services or products
of dubious legality, or outright scams such as work at home opportunities, chain
letters, credit repair, and loan grants.' 69 Internet users, especially companies that
use email services as their employees' main communication tool, complain of the
time associated with deleting spam, the likelihood of unintentionally deleting
legitimate emails, and the extra burden the mass amounts of sparn places on
Internet servers. 7 ° In response to these complaints, state legislatures across the
nation passed a variety of statutes aimed at regulating sparn 7' It is important to
note that Congress took notice of these various state statutes attempting to

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id at 985.

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

See id.(noting that statutes are to be construed with respect to the general notion that a state

ordinarily does not impose penalties under a statute for acts that take place outside its borders).
166Id.
167Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Va'd,
Constrction, and Appication of Federaland State Statutes
Regulating UnsoldtedE-mailor "Spain," 10 A.L.R.6TH 1 (2006).
168 Max P. Ochoa, Legislative Note: Recent State Laws Regulating Unso/idtedEkctvnicMail,16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 459 (2000).
169

Zitter, supra note 167.

170

See id.(stating that "e-mail users have to spend precious time sorting out the few legitimate

messages from a sea of junk'); Ochoa, supra note 168, at 459 (noting the costs spain imposes on
infrastructure).
171 Ochoa, supra note 168, at 459-60.
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regulate spain and responded with the Can-Spam Act of 2003,172 which
73
established national standards for the sending of commercial email.'
17 4
In Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., the court held that a California Business and
75
Professions Code law did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.' The law
regulated the transmission of unsolicited commercial emails by persons or entities
doing business in California. 76 The statute applied to unsolicited documents that
were received by California residents through an "electronic mail service
provider's' 77 service or equipment located in [the] state."' 78 The plaintiff in this
case, a California resident, complained that the defendants engaged in the practice
of sending unsolicited emails that failed to meet the requirements set forth in the
79

statute.

The challengers of the law argued that because the Internet does not have
territorial boundaries, states should not be able to regulate it. 's° However, the
court rejected this argument. The court found that the statute did not regulate the
Internet in general but only applied to email users engaged in sending unsolicited
email to Californiaresidents using equipment located in California.8'
Having found no per se violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the court
then applied the Pike balancing test. 2 The court thoroughly discussed the costs
associated with eliminating unsolicited emails and found that recipients of
unsolicited emails incur substantial costs due to the time required to sort, read,
and discard the unsolicited materials. 3 The court concluded that the state
interest of preventing the expense of deceptive, unsolicited email from falling on
the state's citizens was a "legitimate local purpose."'8" In its examination of the

172 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713.
173

Zitter, supra note 167.

174

Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255 (1st Dist. 2002).
Id at 1269.
Id at 1258. The law required that: persons sending unsolicited emails must provide a toll-free

171
176

number or valid return email address for recipients to notify the sender to stop sending further
unsolicited materials; the sender must inform the recipient of the opportunity to use the toll-free
number or email address to stop the unsolicited materials; the sender must not send further
unsolicited materials if the recipient requests such; and the subject line of the emails must contain
"ADV:" as the first four characters or "ADV:ADLT" for materials that contain adult material. Id.
177 See id. (defining this term as a business or organization qualified to conduct business in the
state of California that provides entities the capabilities needed to send or receive electronic mail).
178 Id.
179

Id. at 1259.

10 Id. at 1260.
181 Id. at 1263. The court stated that it did not accept the holding that any State regulation aimed
at activities on the Internet violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id.
182 Id. at 1262.
183 Id at 1267-68.
184 Id. at 1268.
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burdens the statute placed on interstate commerce, the court stated that the
statute actually facilitated commerce because it helped eliminate fraud and
deception.' 5 In addition, the court found that the time required to place letters
in the subject lines of emails was "appreciably zero," thus not burdening senders
of unsolicited email or interstate commerce.18 6 Consequently, the court concluded
that the local purpose of the statute
outweighed the minimal burden the statute
87
placed on interstate commerce.1
Another case to find an anti-spain state statute constitutional under the
Dormant Commerce Clause was MagyCLE, LLC v. FirstChoice Internet,Inc."ss The
statute, the Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act (MCEMA), required
commercial email that was sent to email addresses held by Maryland residents or
sent using computers located in Maryland to be truthful and non-deceptive. 9The
court held that the act did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause as applied
to an Internet marketing company located outside the state of Maryland that had
engaged in the conduct of sending unsolicited emails to a Maryland resident.'
The court reasoned that the act was facially neutral because it applied to all
email advertisers equally, regardless of whether they were located in Maryland or
outside the state.' 9' The court noted that the statute merely regulated emails that
were sent to Maryland residents or from equipment located in Maryland. Thus
the court reasoned that the statute did not thrust Maryland's laws into other states
because email advertisers were not restrained with regard to sending emails to
192
other states.
Finding the law facially neutral, the court next proceeded to apply the Pike
balancing test. The court found the local benefits of the statute were the
reduction of the financial and social burdens imposed by unsolicited commercial
email.' 93 The court also focused on the benefit of preventing consumers from
falling victim to fraudulent schemes due to false and misleading emails.' 94 With
regard to the burden imposed on interstate commerce, the court found the
burden was merely to disseminate truthful, non-deceptive emails, which it
185 Id

at 1269.

Id.
197 Id.
186

18 MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Intemet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
189 Id at 827, 835.
'90 Id.

at 840.

191 See id at 842 (stating that the statute was not discriminatory towards out-of-state commercial

email senders).
192 Id at 843.
193 Id at 835-36. The court noted that a recent University of Maryland study found the costs
associated with deleting unwanted emails resulted in annual lost productivity of nearly $22 billion.

Id
194

Id. at 836.
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concluded was not a great burden to meet.' The court noted that the focus was
not determining the location of the email recipients because this burden focused
on noncompliance with the statute, which was contrary to the analysis of the Pike
balancing test.' 96 The court concluded that the burden imposed on interstate
commerce was not clearly excessive when viewed in light of the local benefits.'97
3. Other Cases Evaluating State-level Regulation of Business-related Internet
Communications. In Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reily,'98 the First Circuit held a
portion of the Massachusetts Regulations Code violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 99 The regulation made it unlawful "for any persons to advertise or cause
to be advertised within Massachusetts any cigar or little cigar unless the
advertising bears one of the warning statements ...... m0The court stated that all
parties agreed that the statute applied not only to advertisements in magazines
sold in Massachusetts but also to advertisements that appeared on the Internet if
viewed from a computer in Massachusetts.20 '
The court also applied the Pike balancing test and found that the state interest
of ensuring that consumers were informed of the health risks related to the use
of cigars was undoubtedly a legitimate local benefit. 2 2 The court nevertheless
determined that the burden on interstate commerce was clearly excessive. 2 3 With
respect to the issue surrounding advertisements on the Internet, the court felt the
language of the statute would require all advertising on the Internet that could
possibly be viewed from a computer in Massachusetts to carry the required
Massachusetts warning. 2° Because of this effect, the court felt the statute
imposed a great burden on interstate commerce. 205 It is important to note that
in this case the court held the statute imposed a clearly excessive burden on
interstate commerce even though that burden could potentially be merely
incidental.20 6

19'

Id at 835.

196 See id at 841 (stating that the United States Supreme Court developed the Pike balancing test

to assess the cost associated with comping with a challenged statute).
197 Id at 841-42.
19' Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000), cert.granted, 531 U.S. 1068 (2001),
affidinpart,rv'd inpart on othergroands, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).

9 Id. at 58.
2 Id. at 55.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 56.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205

Id.

' See id. (stating that "even accepting the Attorney General's further position that any effect on
interstate commerce is only incidental, the resulting burden on interstate commerce is clearly
excessive, even in relation to [Massachusetts'] strong interest in informing consumers of health
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However, a different Dormant Commerce Clause result was reached in Ford
Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transportation.°7 In this case, the Fifth Circuit found
that a Texas law, which prohibited auto manufacturers from any form of
marketing and sales of automobiles inside the state of Texas, 28 did not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause.2" 9 The plaintiffs in the case argued that the statute
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because the statute had a discriminatory
effect on out-of-state interests. 210 However, the court found this argument to be
unpersuasive.2 1'
The court stated that the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence with
respect to out-of-state discrimination finds discriminatory practices only when
similarly situated in-state and out-of-state interests are treated differently. 1 2 The
court argued that the statute did not discriminate against similarly situated
automobile dealers; rather the statute discriminated against all automobile
manufacturers regardless of their domicile and whether they conducted business
via the Internet.213 Thus, the court found that the statute did not protect Texas
automobile dealers from out-of-state automobile dealers; it protected Texas
automobile dealers from competition from manufacturers in general.214
The above cases illustrate the divergence of opinion on how statutes
attempting to regulate the Internet should be classified with regard to an undue
burden on interstate commerce. Some courts reason that statutes regulating the
Internet will always impose an undue burden on interstate commerce merely
because of the borderless nature of the Internet."' These courts feel the solution
is national (rather than state-by-state) regulation.216 Nevertheless, there are other
courts that feel Internet regulations can be upheld under a Dormant Commerce

risks').
" Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001).
208 See id. at 498 (stating that the statute made it unlawful to engage in the business of an
automobile dealership without first obtaining a license; however, the statute prohibited
manufacturers from being eligible to receive a license for any activities related to the operation of
a dealership).
209 Id

Id. at 499.
211Id.passim.
212 Id. at 500.
213 See id. at 502 (domicile), 505 (Internet).
214 Id at 502.
215 See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); supra 120 and
210

accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Am. libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); supra 120 and
accompanying text.
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Clause analysis because the effects of the varying state statutes only reach within
the specific states enacting the statutes." 7
The courts are also divided in their approach to weighing local interests against
the burdens placed on interstate commerce. The above cases demonstrate that
some courts are willing to find an undue burden on interstate commerce, even
though the statute would further legitimate state interests."' However, the cases
also show that other courts feel that local interests can be strong enough to
outweigh any potential burden on interstate commerce.219 In all, these cases
represent a heavily divided judiciary as to the topic of Internet regulations and the
effect of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
III. ANALYSIS
By using the cases discussed in Part II.H as guidelines, this Part of the Note
will analyze the Utah Act under the Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The statues from the above cases will be compared and contrasted with the Utah
Act to determine how a court would have likely ruled on the constitutionality of
the Utah Act. The constitutional jurisprudence utilized includes the three modem
categories of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis discussed above. 20 This Part
will assess the Utah Act with regard to each of the three categories to determine
if the Utah Act would have operated in such a manner as to place an undue
burden on interstate commerce.
A. FIRST CATEGORY

OF DCC ANALYSIS:

STATE

LAWS THAT FACIALLY

DISCRIMINATE AGAINST OUT-OF-STATE COMMERCE

State statutes that facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce are per
se invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause."'
Because facially
discriminatory laws are nearly always struck down, states rarely enact these types
of statutes.222 Consequently, none of the above cases involved facially
discriminatory statutes. 3 However, this issue was discussed in American

217 See, e.g., People v. Hsu, 82 Cal. App. 4th 976 (lst Dist. 2000); supra note 152 and
accompanying text.
21'

See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); supranote 120 and

accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255 (1 st Dist. 2002); spra note 174
and accompanying text.
220 See supra Part II.G.
221 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

22' See supra Part II.H.
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Booksellers Foundation.24 In that case, when examining the statute, which sought
to regulate Internet communications with minors involving sexually explicit
materials, the court found the law was not facially discriminatory because the
statute on its face did not apply to those individuals located outside the state.22
Similarly, the Utah Act, on itsface, did not attempt to regulate individuals outside
the state.226 Section 70-3a-402(3) provided that:
For a violation of Subsection (1)(C),227 the person whose business,
goods, or service is advertised, and the person who sells or displays
the advertisement are liable if: (a) the advertisement is at any time
displayed in the state, or (b) the advertiser or person selling the
advertisement is locatedin the state.28
This section demonstrates that the Utah Act, on its face, limited the scope of
its reach to only those advertisers located in the state or advertisements displayed
in the state.'29 Because the Utah Act facially attempted to limit its scope to apply
only within the state boundaries of Utah, a court would have likely found, just as
in American Booksellers Foundation, that the statute was not facially discriminatory
against out-of-state commerce. Thus, the Utah Act would have survived the first
prong of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.

" See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
"2 This section of analysis involving only the first category of DCC assumes arguendo that search
engines and other advertising entities on the Internet can geographically limit the placement of ads.
"'
Section 70-3a-402(1)(c) stated
any person is liable in a civil action brought by the registrant... if that person:
uses an electronic registration mark to cause the delivery or display of an
advertisement for a business, goods, or a service: (i) of the same class, as defined
in Section 70-3a-308, other than the business, goods, or service of the registrant
of the electronic registration mark; or (ii) if that advertisement is likely to cause
confusion between the business, goods, or service of the registrant of the
electronic registration mark and the business, goods, or service advertised.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-402(1)(c) (Supp. 2007).
' Id § 7 0-3a-40 2 (3) (emphasis added).
22

29 Id.
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B. SECOND CATEGORY OF DCC ANALYSIS: STATE LAWS THAT ARE FACIALLY
NEUTRAL BUT DIRECTLY REGULATE OR DISCRIMINATE AGAINST INTERSTATE
COMMERCE OR FAVOR LOCAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF
OUT-OF-STATE COMPETITORS

As Part III.A determined that the Utah Act was not facially discriminatory, it
follows that the Utah Act would have been labeled facially neutral. Therefore, it
must be determined whether the Utah Act favored local economic interests to the
detriment of out-of-state competitors or directly regulated or discriminated
against interstate commerce. As noted above in Part II.G, courts often look to
the effects of the state statute to determine whether the statute discriminates
against out-of-state competitors or interstate commerce.
Because, the Utah Act was never officially implemented, the effects of the
statute are mere speculation. 230 However, unlike the FordMotorCo. case, in which
th Fifth Circuit found that under the statute at issue similarly situated in-state
and out-of-state automobile dealers were treated equally,23 ' the Utah Act would
not have resulted in equal treatment of similarly situated in-state and out-of-state
interests. The likely effects of the statute would have tended to favor local
economic interests to the detriment of out-of-state competitors. The Utah Act
allowed only those marks that were in use in the state of Utah to be registered as
an electronic registration mark.2 32 Therefore, it was possible that local businesses
would have been able to register their marks, while out-of-state competitors
would have been left with no protection.
This left the door open for an out-of-state competitor (Cl) to buy another
out-of-state competitor's (C2) trademark as a keyword. This scenario would have
then allowed C1 to advertise with C2's trademark as a keyword in Utah, since the
Utah Act would not have applied either to C1 or C2 because they are both out-ofstate businesses. Neither Cl nor C2 would have been able to register their marks,
and thus the Utah Act had no bearing on their situation. But C1 would not have
been allowed to buy the mark of a Utah competitor (Ul) to advertise within the
state of Utah if UI had registered its mark as an electronic registration mark. As
a result, Ul would have been uninhibited by competitor's ads when reaching
Internet users in Utah, while C2's Internet advertising in Utah would have been
limited because of Cl's purchase of C2's mark. This scenario embodies the type
of complicated situation that would have occurred if the Utah Act had stood and
been implemented. This example shows that it is likely the Utah Act would have
failed under the second category of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis because

2 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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the Utah Act would have most likely been viewed as favoring local economic
interests to the detriment of out-of-state competitors.
In addition, there is another strand under the second category of Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis that needs to be addressed. States also may not
directly regulate or discriminate against interstate commerce.233 This section of
analysis creates the dividing point for many courts because of a divergence in
opinion regarding whether the nature of the Internet automatically leads to a
conclusion that Internet-based regulations directly regulate interstate commerce.
In People v. Hsu, the court found that the statute aimed at Internet
communications with minors involving sexually explicit materials only regulated
conduct that occurred within the state of California.234 However, the court did
not discuss the impact of limiting the statute to apply only to those acts occurring
in California. Limiting the statute to acts only in California would mean that
individuals located outside the state could still send sexually explicit materials to
California minors without being prosecuted. Notwithstanding that the state
interest in protecting minors would be dampened, it would still be plausible only
to prosecute those individuals in California that sent sexually explicit materials to
minors within the state. Conversely, the court in American Booksellers Foundation
reasoned that the statute at issue in that case would in effect apply to Internet
website operators located outside the state of Vermont that were involved with
disseminating information via the Internet, since a person outside Vermont
cannot prevent people within Vermont from looking at material posted on a
website.2 3 s
The effect of the Utah Act would have been most similar to the effect of the
statute in the American Booksellers Foundationcase. The Utah Act provided that
marks registered as electronic marks could not be purchased by third parties as
keywords for advertising purposes. Although the statute attempted to limit its
scope to apply only within the state of Utah, such a limitation was not feasible like
it was in People v. Hsu, because the statute provided for liability if an advertisement
of a third party containing the electronic registration mark was at any time
displayed in the state. 236 This implied that out-of-state search engines and
advertising entities would have had to ensure that either they did not sell any of
the Utah electronic registration marks or that they developed a method to limit
the geographical scope of advertisements so that any electronic registration mark
that was bought by a third party for advertising outside the state of Utah was not
displayed to any Utah Internet user. Either way, the Utah Act would have directly

3 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
4 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
3 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
"'
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-402(1)(c), (3)(a) (Supp. 2007).
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regulated interstate commerce because it would have had an effect on out-of-state
individuals. Therefore, just as the court in American Booksellers Foundation
concluded, a court would have likely found that the Utah Act's effect was to
directly regulate commerce within other states.
C. THIRD CATEGORY OF DCC ANALYSIS: STATE LAWS THAT ARE FACIALLY
NEUTRAL BUT HAVE A DISPROPORTIONATE ADVERSE EFFECT ON INTERSTATE
COMMERCE WHEN A BALANCING TEST IS APPLIED

Most courts appear to apply the Pike balancing test in almost all cases of
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis." v The cases also demonstrate that there is
much conflicting opinion as to whether state Internet regulations unduly burden
interstate commerce.238
When applying the Pike balancing test, it is important to examine the local
public interests that the statute seeks to effectuate. 23 ' The local interests that the
Utah Act attempted to protect were the rights that trademark owners possess in
the value of their trademarks. 2" As a result of keyword advertising practices,
many trademark owners are having their trademarks exploited and their rights
infringed.24' Unlike the statute at issue in American LibrariesAss'n,242 there are no
other statutes in place in Utah that are designed to deal with the topic of keyword
advertising. The court in American LibrariesAss'n concluded that because there
were other statutes in place that could deal with the problems related to child
pornography, the local benefits of the statute were weakened.2 43 Using this
reasoning, perhaps a court might have concluded that because Utah has no other
statutes in place to deal with the issue of keyword advertising, more weight could
have been given to the local interests the Utah Act attempted to further.
When examining the cases that found no Dormant Commerce Clause
violation under a Pike balancing test, the trend emerges that the local interests that
were held to outweigh the effects on interstate commerce were those of minors

237See supra Part II.H.
" Compare supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (interstate commerce not unduly
burdened), witb supranotes 150-51 and accompanying text (state Internet regulations directly regulate
interstate commerce).
" See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
24 See Dan Eastman, Utah State Senator, THE SENATE SITE, Apr. 5, 2007, http://senatesite.
com/blog/2007/04/identity-theft-next-generadon.html (discussing the reasoning behind passing
the Utah Act).
241 See supra Part II.C.
242 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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and private citizens of the state. 2 " Unlike the statute in Peoplev. Hsu, the Utah Act
did not attempt to provide protection to minors from harmful sexually explicit
materials.24 Likewise, in contrast to the statute in Ferguson v. Friendfinders,Inc., the
Utah Act did not prevent the local harm of expenses from falling on the state's
citizens. 24 Instead, the Utah Act sought to provide protection for those who
hold trademark rights.247
Typically, those who hold trademark rights are businesses and other large
companies who are actually engaged in commerce since the Lanham Act requires
a trademark to be at use in commerce to qualify for protection. 48 Unlike minors
and state citizens, large companies and businesses often do not require special
protection because they are able to provide for themselves. It is plausible that
trademark owners could have used the reasoning from MayCLE, LLC, which
found that preventing consumer fraud was an important local interest, 49 to argue
that the Utah Act would have helped protect the state citizens from deception
that results from keyword advertising. However, this argument could have
proven fatal because many courts that are faced with likelihood of confusion
keyword advertising does not result
claims in keyword advertising are finding that
50
in confusion on the part of Internet users.
A case that severely hindered a finding of a legitimate local interest under the
Utah Act is ConsolidatedCigarCorp.2"' This case illustrates a court finding a statute
invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause even though a legitimate public
interest was served by the statute. The local interest was ensuring that state
citizens were informed of health risks associated with the consumption of
cigars. 2-2 The Utah Act provided no similar health protection for its citizens.
Clearly the local public interest in the ConsolidatedCigarCor. case was greater than
the interest under the Utah Act, because the interest in Consolidated CigarCorp.
involved the health and well-being of the state citizens.
The second factor under the Pike balancing approach that needs to be
addressed is the burden imposed on interstate commerce.2 5 3 The impact on
interstate commerce is debatable. As demonstrated in Consolidated Cigar Corp.,
many courts feel the nature of the Internet makes it inherently difficult, if not

244 See, e.g., supra notes 157, 183 and accompanying text.
245 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
24

See supra note 184 and accompanying text.

247 Eastman, supra note 240.
248 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.

s See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.

25'

" See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.

253
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impossible, to distinguish among the states in which a particular advertisement is
being viewed.2" Therefore, many courts feel the burden on interstate commerce
imposed by individual state Internet regulations is clearly excessive."' As the
Utah Act was a state statute that imposed restrictions on Internet advertising, it
would appear that it could have fallen under the reasoning of Consolidated Cigar
Cotp., since that case involved an advertising regulation." 6
However, at least one legal commentator felt the Utah Act might not have
imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce because of the ability of search
engine companies to geographically limit the placement of advertisements "down
to a neighborhood level."2 7 This commentator posed the question: "If search
engines are already restricting searches based on the searcher's geographic
location, then what is the additional burden preventing them from complying with
Utah's law?" 2 8 Predictably, the legal commentator's answer is that there would
have been no additional burden and therefore there would have been no undue
burden imposed by the Utah Act.25 9 However, if search engines do not have the
current capability of limiting advertisements, it might have been nearly impossible
for these companies to have complied with the requirements of the Utah Act
without having adopted a universal practice of not allowing any advertiser to bid
on a third party trademark. If this would have been the result the search engines
must have had to eventually yield to, then the Utah Act would have been directly
regulating interstate commerce and therefore would have placed an undue burden
on interstate commerce.
Furthermore, other legal commentators argued that the technology has not
been developed that would have allowed search engine companies to have reliably
identified Utah Internet users. 260 As a result, the search engine companies would
have had to develop ways in which such users could have been readily identified
so as to ensure that such users were not presented with advertisements that had
been linked by keywords that had been classified under the Utah Act as electronic
registration marks. It is likely that a court would have found imposing this
responsibility on search engine companies placed an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
Comparing both sides under the Pike balancing test shows that the local
benefits that could have been gained by the statute were small because they were

s See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
s See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
z See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
s Posting of Matthew Prince to The Senate Site, http://senatesite.com/blog/2007/04/consti
tutionality-of-trademark.html (Apr. 9, 2007, 13:27 MST).
258 id.
259

Id.
Parry,supra note 82.
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directed at trademark owners, not the general citizens of Utah. In addition, the
burden that would have been placed on interstate commerce was likely to have
been excessive because outside search engines would have had to comply with the
act to avoid liability for advertisements displayed in Utah that were keyed to
electronic registration marks. When both sides are weighed under the balancing
test, it is likely that a court would have found the burden on interstate commerce
outweighed any local interests that might have been served by the Act and
therefore would have held that the Act was unconstitutional under the third
category of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
D. EXCEPTIONS TO DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

Because the Utah Act would have likely failed to pass constitutional standards
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the exceptions the Dormant Commerce
Clause need to be examined to determine if they could have saved the Utah Act.
As discussed in Part II, the first exception is quarantine laws.261 The Utah Act
clearly did not involve any type of quarantine issues because it addressed
trademarks and not any type of disease or contagious particle. Also, the Act did
not further any underlying purpose of this exception, such as providing special
health-protective measures for the citizens of the state.
The Act also would have failed to qualify under the second exception of
market participant. 262 Through the passage of the Act, the state of Utah was
clearly attempting to address a problem and therefore was acting as a regulator
and not as a market participant. Thus, the Utah Act would not have been
salvaged through either of these exceptions.
E. RECOMMENDED SUGGESTIONS FOR STATES WANTING TO REGULATE
KEYWORD ADVERTISING

There are not many suggestions regarding the regulation of keyword
advertising that can be made that would help states keep such statutes within the
realm of constitutionality under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
As
demonstrated by the Utah Act, such statutes are likely to directly regulate
interstate commerce, favor local economic interests to the detriment of out-ofstate competitors, and weigh heavily in favor of the undue burden side of the Pike
balancing test. Therefore, for statutes to comply with the requirements of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, states would need to ensure that all these
constitutional concerns were addressed.

'

See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.

262 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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To remedy the favoring of local interests, perhaps states could allow anyone,
regardless of the location of their goods or services, to register their mark as an
electronic mark, thus guaranteeing outsiders protection within the particular state.
However, in order to cure the other two Dormant Commerce Clause issues, a
change would have to be made to the way search engines display advertisements.
Search engines would need to be able to geographically limit advertisements
before a state could be found not to directly regulate or place an undue burden
on interstate commerce. The best suggestion that can be recommended is for
concerned states and trademark owners that are experiencing Internet
infringement to lobby Congress and urge a national regulation similar to the CanSpam Act that would prohibit trademarks from being used as keywords by third
parties.
IV. CONCLUSION

Keyword advertising is a hugely profitable revenue source for search engines.
However, this type of advertising comes at a cost to some trademark owners.
The practice of selling trademark terms to third parties for the purpose of
advertisement has created much controversy. Courts have been divided in their
approach to the problem. It is unclear at this point whether the Lanham Act will
provide any protection for trademark owners in these circumstances. The debate
about whether the practice results in a "use in commerce" and if so, whether the
practice then leads to a likelihood of confusion, continues to become more
convoluted with each case that goes to court.
In response to the matter, Utah enacted its own statute to deal with the
problem. The Trademark Protection Act was passed in 2007 in an attempt to
regulate keyword advertising. The Act created a new type of intellectual property
right known as the "electronic registration mark." After a mark was registered,
search engines were not allowed to sell the mark to third party advertisers.
However, the Utah Legislature voted to repeal the substantive portions of the
Act. This decision to repeal the Utah Act was the correct decision because it was
likely that a court would have deemed the Act unconstitutional. The Act violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits a state from discriminating
against interstate commerce. Although not facially discriminatory, the Act
nevertheless favored local economic interests to the detriment of out-of-state
competitors by allowing only trademarks that were in use in the state of Utah to
gain protection. The Act also placed an undue burden on interstate commerce
by requiring search engines to geographically limit advertisements to ensure that
no trademark registered as an electronic registration mark inside the state of Utah
was displayed on search pages for those keywords by Utah Internet users. For
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these reasons, the Act would have likely been found unconstitutional for violating
the Dormant Commerce Clause.

Mqy Candice Barrett
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